ANOTHER MIDEAST CEASEFIRE
ANOTHER MIDEAST CEASEFIRE—WHO
WINS, WHO LOSES, WHO CARES, AND
WHO’S KIDDING WHO?
by
Ken Eliasberg
Does anyone recall how many ceasefires we have had in the Mideast; I don’t, but it seems to me they’re about as regular as the spring equinox and just about as transitory. Rather than a period at the end of a violent sentence, they’re more like a hypen—you know, a pause during which the Arabs can prepare for their next onslaught on “the Zionist State,” and Israelis can take a time out (while neither deluding themselves or ever letting their guard down). No wonder, then, that Olmert expressed the fatigue that Israelis must feel living with the tension that comes with being surrounded by several hundred thousand Neanderthals who are bent on your destruction (having worked very hard at their own for well over a thousand years; indeed, destruction and decadence are the conditions with which Arabs seem the most comfortable and conditions that they would like to visit on us once they have finished with Israel).
WINNERS—HEZBOLLAH, SYRIA, IRAN, AND TERROR. No sooner had what appeared to be a preliminary agreement been reached than everyone, - Olmert, Bush, Nasrallah, etc.—was out declaring their respective side the winner. Let me give you my take—it wasn’t even close. This round—and it could turn out to be a critical round in that it might be an indication of things to come—went to the bad guys, and, again, it wasn’t even close. Iran won an unbelievable victory, no matter how hard we try put lipstick on this pig. Any way you look at this situation, it is hard to see an Israeli victory, and the way they are trying to—i.e. body and equipment count—is absurd. Why? Because Arab terrorists care almost as little about their dead as they do about the Israelis. Quite to the contrary, they are comforted in the knowledge that their dead are martyred while the Israelis are just dead. Second, for every dead Hezbollah fighter, there are probably 5,000 ready to take his place. Israel, on the other hand, does not have this unlimited reserve of bodies. And, more fundamentally, Israel values life, and they know that the loss of a life cannot be measured in terms of its replacement value. A Muslim mother may grieve, but she is comforted in the knowledge her son is with his 72 virgins; an Israeli mother derives no such comfort—she had looked forward to having her son and his children by her side. Golda Meir had it right when she said that there will be peace when Muslim mothers love their children more than they hate Jews.
So Shimon Peres looks at victory in terms of a body and equipment count, he has missed the point on both scores—(1) Hezbollah will have 1,000 men there tomorrow to replace each fallen martyr, and Iran will replace the lost equipment in short order. Israel has, even by Peres’s reckoning lost this war.
Perhaps more significant than either the mechanics or the results of the war, was its intensity and duration. Hezbollah destroyed the myth of Israeli invincibility, and Israel will pay dearly for this loss. Why? Because, Hezbollah’s recruiting efforts will be greatly enhanced by summoning would-be terrorists to the side of a force that held Israel in check for over 30 days, and, which, while losing the body count, provided a much tougher challenge than anyone expected. One cannot for a moment underestimate the importance of the psychology that enters into waging war. Hezbollah does not give a damn about the men it has lost, nor, for that matter, do they care one bit about the dead Lebanese civilians that the war produced. On the contrary, as one author pointed out, a dead Lebanese civilian was an incredible source of good public relations for Hezbollah; they will simply blame it on those terrible Israelis who used such “disproportionate” force. So, even though they caused the war, in the eyes of most Lebanese, the destruction visited upon them is the fault of Israel, no matter who provoked the confrontation (not that the Lebanese would have supported Israel were there no destruction—at least not the Arab Lebanese).
Then, to top it off, Hezbollah will come in and render, through the good offices of Iran and Syria, assistance in repairing the damage, making them look like the good guys to the Lebanese (which they would be, in all events, since the great majority of Arabs will always favor the side of an Arab over a Jew, no matter what the nature or source of the controversy).
And, when the smoke clears, Lebanon will, as Jed Babbin has pointed out, become Hezbollahstan—Lebanon will be no more. The wonderful little country on the Eastern shore of the Mediteranean (you will recall that Beirut was once described as the Paris of the Middle East) will be gone. And in its place, another piece in the puzzle that Iran wishes to ultimately become the next global Caliphate.
Speaking of Iran, they are big winners in this little drama. The whole war was probably no more than Iran’s effort to divert attention from its nuclear program. And it served this purpose. Chalk one—a big one—up for Iran.
Syria too benefited, of course, but it is a fairly meaningless player in the Middle East, a pawn of Iran’s that serves as a sort of middle man between Iran and its surrogate, Hezbollah, allowing fighters to train on its soil and pass through its territory on their way to Lebanon.
And possibly the biggest political winner in this whole mess is the far left in this country in the sense that they hate George Bush so much that they view any loss to Bush as a gain to them, no matter how damaging it might be to the national security of our country
LOSERS: ISRAEL, OLMERT, AMERICA, AND THE CAUSE OF FREEDOM.- For Israel, this war was a disaster—a loss, no matter what approach you take to evaluate the situation. First of all, one never got the impression that Israel was fully committed to this effort until it was almost over. They moved with less than deliberate speed, relying almost exclusively on airpower to win the victory—this was a military mistake and a public relations mistake. Not only could Israel not win in this manner, but it allowed the war to drag on, costing Israel an incredible amount of public relations damage. Also, Israel seemed tentative in its approach and indecisive in the manner in which it waged the war. In the 80s when Israel invaded Lebanon—also to rout terrorists—it took only some 3 hours to reach the Litani river; this time they didn’t even reach the Litani in more than 30 days. Moreover, it is not unreasonable to assume that this somewhat lethargic manner of waging war was responsible for more casualties than might otherwise have been the case.
Some time ago, Olmert had expressed the opinion that Israel was tired of the constant tension engendered by having to live under an almost constant threat of terror and/or war. That fatigue was certainly apparent in the almost half-hearted manner in which Israel waged this war. I believe that it will cost Olmert his job, and I would not be the least bit surprised to see Netanyahu back in charge within the next 3 or 4 months
America lost because our friend and ally lost. Indeed, whenever a democracy suffers a loss, it is our loss. But this was ours in a more immediate sense. We backed this horse, and, while some might argue that it placed or showed, no one can—at least to my satisfaction - make the case that it won. Its effect on Geroge Bush is problematic—at least to me. Some might argue that not only did he take a partisan position (one with which I fully agree), but he did so ineffectively in that either he did not allow Israel to pull the plugs or did not encourage it to move harder and faster, were Israel inclined to pull out all the stops. On the other hand, it can be said that at least he backed the right horse, even if it did not win. Time will tell (November will provide some indication of the country’s mood in this regard).
Perhaps the biggest loser is the cause of freedom, and I strongly believe that unfolding events will make it abundantly clear that this is the case. To be continued -