IRAQ: THE LEFT’S CRITICISMS V
IRAQ: THE LEFT’S CRITICISMS—V
by
Ken Eliasberg
Last week, in dealing with the left’s “substantive” complaints as to how the war in Iraq is being waged we focused only on the alleged inadequacies of the “plan.” This week let’s take a look at a few more of these threadbare substantive complaints—specifically, (1) our losses, (2) the absence of an exit strategy, (3) Iraq as a diversion from, rather than an integral part of, the war on terror, and (4) unnecessarily sharpening the war’s focus by localizing it in Iraq, thus bringing large numbers of terrorists to the area, thereby increasing the danger to our troops by making them a target for a larger number of assassins. Let’s see if these arguments have any merit.
1. Our Losses.- To date we have lost approximately 2,750 military personnel in the combined combat areas of Afghanistan and Iraq. At the outset, let’s make it clear that the loss of one G.I. is one too many for me. Let’s also make it clear once again that this is war, and as Abraham Lincoln observed: “You don’t fight wars by blowing rose water through corn stalks.” So when I say that our losses in this engagement are infinitesimal when contrasted with either the expectations or predictions, or, more to the point, when compared to previous conflagrations, it is in no way intended to trivialize these deaths. Rather it is an effort to put these losses in some sort of perspective, to contextualize them if you will; you cannot look at any war in the abstract when evaluating its casualties—you must evaluate the war by looking at how in compares with its predecessors. And, on that basis, this war has been a stroll in the park.
To date, we have lost approximately 2,700 soldiers in both the Afghan and Iraqui campaigns. We invaded Afghanistan in October, 2001 and Iraq early in 2003. If we look at these dates (as opposed to 9/11/01), then the organized military aspect of the war dates from 10/01, a period of roughly 4 and