IRAQ: THE ISG REPORT AND THE “SERGE”
IRAQ: THE ISG REPORT AND THE “SERGE”
- SHOULD EITHER BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY?
by
Ken Eliasberg
The major issue confronting the country today—and the principal reason for the recent Republican defeat—is the war in Iraq. The President, correctly, in my opinion, believes that Iraq is an integral part of the war on terror, while the Dems seem to think it is a costly diversion (although, again, one must note that they haven’t always thought this way; they were of a different view in 1998 as to the danger posed by Iraq—they only switched their position when Bush adapted it). And the dialogue to date has been peppered with slogans like “stay the course” or “cut and run.” The former is at least a strategy, one that must be fleshed out with suitable tactics (which, to date, has not been done in a very satisfactory manner). The latter, which the Dems support (all the while trying to deny it by putting a pretty face on it) is nothing but an expression of appeasement and surrender. We are in this war—every one wishes it were otherwise (either because it were not necessary or because we should not be in this position to begin with). All would like to extricate ourselves in the most appropriate manner with minimum loss - of either life or face. The only difference between the parties seems to be that the Republicans would like to leave a stable and democratic Iraq (and, as a consequence, a safer world), while the Dems would just like to leave (without seeming to be too concerned about the consequential safety of either, the world, or, more to the point, the U.S.).
Two pronouncements have recently been made which may (or may not, depending on the extent to which they are implemented) have an effect on the course of developments in Iraq (and, as a consequence, developments in the U.S., i.e. the course followed with respect to each may well determine the presidential outcome in 2008). They are the recommendations contained in the Iraq Study Group Report (ISG), and the president’s request for a “serge,” i.e. an escalation of troops in Iraq, with a concomitant adjustment in the tactics with which the war is to be fought, i.e. the “rules of engagement.”
Let me first give you my assessment of the value of the ISG report—it is completely worthless. It is unimaginably idiotic, and, more to the point, a complete exercise in futility. In essence what this august body is recommending is that we talk to Iran and Syria with a view to soliciting their aid in resolving our Iraqi problem. Hellloooo—these 2 countries are a big part (the biggest part) of our Iraqi problem. The recommendation is covered over with some flowery language like “we have to talk to our enemies” (and, help me out here, tell them what), and that Iran and Syria have an interest in clearing up the chaos in Iraq. This latter observation is so preposterous as to beg the question of the author’s sanity. First of all, as noted, these 2 countries, particularly Iran, are creating a good deal of the chaos in Iraq. And second, and more to the point, why would Iran and Syria like a stable and democratic country on their border? Would these 2 despotic regimes really want to see democracy break out in the region?? Give me a break!
But haven’t we been down this road before. How does this differ, if at all, from Munich in 1938? Let me simplify it for you—it’s worse! Hitler was, to a certain limited extent, slightly more nuanced in his desire to take over Europe, giving hope (albeit a slim hope) to the other major powers that peace might be the outcome of such discussions. What do we talk about with Iran, who has already told us that, after denying the first holocaust, they have every intention of bringing about a second such event? And, assuming that there is a negotiation opening of some limited nature, what do we negotiate about? The only thing that Iran wants from us is for us to get out of the way of their nuclear ambitions. This is a deal breaker—we simply cannot let Iran have such weaponry. Why not? Because Iran is not only more overtly belligerant than Nazi Germany was, but, more to the point, Hitler never had atomic weapons. And Nazis, although bad guys, had no desire to die (whereas radical Muslims seem to find the thought inspiring). I find the ISG report incomprehensibly ridiculous; I have a better been chance of flying (without the aid of a plane) than these recommendations have of providing a solution to our problem in Iraq.
As far as Syria is concerned, their position will, in all likelihood, not differ from that of Iran. Assuming that they were willing to enter into negotiations at all (and further assuming that they could be trusted to honor any obligation that they took on pursuant to such negotiations—a laughable assumption in view of our history with Arab agreements—what price would they ask us to pay)? Simple—return the Golan Heights to them. Unless, as part of such negotiation arrangements, Israel was included as a negotiating partner and, in turn, secured from Syria the agreement to recognized Israel’s existence and permanently suspend any acts of terrorism, any such agreement amounts to little more than selling Israel out.
How about the “serge” —where can that go? Without changing the rules of engagement—i.e. taking off the gloves and not trying to fight a politically correct war to appease the anti-war left in this country—it will do no more than put more than 20,000 of our best and brightest in harm’s way. That is, unless we seriously commit to waging war with all the intensity that we can bring to bear, then the serge will do no more than postpone the inevitable failure in Iraq. We can win, but we have not been fighting this war in a manner calculated to win. In sports there is an old saying, you play to win; you never play not to lose (because you will). And we have been fighting this war not to lose - we have not been fighting it to win. Permit me to elaborate. War is brutal, messy, violent, savage, and imprecise - and people get killed, and the goal is to see to it that a lot more of them get killed than do of our people—it is never about proportionality. On the contrary, you want the greatest amount of disproportionality you can have, and you want it for 2 reasons: (1) you always want to keep your casualties to a minimum, and (2) you want to inspire fear in the enemy? Why? To destroy their will to fight—to make them aware that they may not be able to absorb the damage that you intend to inflict on them—to take away hope. Unless the “serge” means that we are now prepared to do that—i.e. take off the gloves and hunt these guys down and kill them, wherever they are - then sending in 20,000 more of our young men and women is merely putting 20,000 more of our best and brightest in harm’s way. Unless we are prepared to turn them loose and empower them to do whatever it takes, whatever death and destruction is necessary to visit on the enemy, then the surge is a splurge in which we can ill afford to indulge. Next week, what victory looks like and what it takes to produce it.